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Afterword: Disability, Strategic Action,
and Reciprocity
Lawrence C. Becker
The essays in this volume focus on philosophical problems that are ex-
tremely difficult. As we have seen, there are problems of definition that
threaten to dissolve the distinction between the able and the disabled,
problems of moral imagination in identifying and understanding each oth-
ers’ needs, problems about Kantian concerns for human dignity and utili-
tarian concerns for aggregate welfare, problems about fairness in the allo-
cation of benefits and burdens, problems about the meaning of equality in
this context, and problems about the appropriate moral response to the
natural evils that befall us all to varying degrees. Equally able philosophers
disagree about all of these matters, and it is of course appropriate for them
to focus on the most challenging philosophical issues and the most persis-
tent disagreements about them. How else will we make progress on these
matters?
Yet there is something in this discussion that does not quite square with
my own experience in living with a significant physical disability since my
early teens. My experience has been that when my own ‘‘disability issues’’
are framed either in terms of love or in terms of justice, in the long run
things do not go very well for anyone concerned. Moreover, I have reason
to believe that my experience in this regard is not merely idiosyncratic. On
the contrary, there is a general philosophical explanation for it in the the-
ory of strategic action coupled with a consideration of norms of reciproc-
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ity. (No doubt there is also a particular psychohistorical explanation for
my experience as well—one that makes a more entertaining story.)
The philosophical explanation interests me because it situates the dis-
couraging difficulties explored in this volume in a larger, less discouraging
context. In short, I will argue that we can resolve many conflicts about
disability and distributive justice by treating them as coordination prob-
lems. And I am hopeful that if we pursue disability issues in this larger
context, we will be able both to see their most difficult aspects more clearly
and to make some surprising progress in resolving them.
Hardin on the Limitations of Reason
In an important book,1 Russell H ardin argues that careful attention to our
limitations as rational agents is crucial for moral theory. In particular, he
emphasizes three limitations that all human agents need to face squarely:
the extent of our ignorance about the consequences of our actions, the
intractable difficulties of our value theories, and the fact that we can ac-
complish very little without the active and sustained cooperation of other
human agents. H ardin’s aim is to use reflection on these limitations to
construct a justification for utilitarian moral theory, but his point of depar-
ture is a perfectly general one of the first importance. H ere I want to focus
on the third of the limitations he mentions—the one that gives rise to the
strategic dimension of human action.
It is now commonplace in discussions of disability for writers to point
out that all human beings have extended periods of dependency during
the normal life-cycle—in infancy and early childhood, in periods of illness
or injury, in senescence—and in general have great vulnerability, not only
in matters of their physical and psychological health as well as life itself but
also in their attachments to all sorts of external goods, ranging from the
most mundane matters of physical comfort to the most exalted rewards
of intimate relationships. At our best, the argument goes, we are only
temporarily ‘‘abled,’’ and we should reflect on this fact carefully before we
decide how to treat the permanently disabled.
H ardin’s point is a stronger one: No one is even temporarily able to
1. Russell H ardin, Morality within the Limits of R eason (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1988).
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accomplish very much at all by her own actions, independent of the re-
sponses of others. No matter how others respond—whether they oppose
her, ignore her, help her, or simply stand out of the way—she will need to
adapt her conduct accordingly in order to succeed. That does not mean
that she will always have to fight the opposition, curry favor, or accept
help. (After all, sometimes a soft answer actually does turn away wrath;
sometimes a low profile is a good thing; sometimes accepting help is more
trouble than it is worth.) It does, however, mean that she will have to
consider what to do in the light of the responses she is likely to get from
various courses of action she might take. That is to say, if she wishes to act
effectively, she will have to act strategically, and not simply as if the prob-
lem were simply to decide what is right in some abstract sense, and then
to do it, regardless of what others might do. I simply add to this the obser-
vation that there is no direct correlation between the extent to which one
must act strategically and the extent to which one is disabled—though
there is sometimes a correlation between the extent of a disability and the
range of strategic responses available to an agent.
Now consider three general sorts of strategic situations that we face.
Borrowing H ardin’s terms we may identify them as situations of pure con-
flict, pure coordination, or mixtures of conflict and coordination.2
We have a pure conflict situation whenever a net gain by one person
necessarily involves a net loss by another. Zero-sum (constant-sum) games
are examples of this. And in general, whenever we compete for shares of a
fixed sum of resources, my gain is necessarily your loss, ceteris paribus.
We have a pure coordination situation whenever it is possible (if we
simply coordinate our conduct) for everyone to gain. Rules of the road
are good examples. It typically does not matter what the rules are (e.g.,
whether we are to drive on the left or the right); it only matters that we
coordinate on the same set of determinate rules. Social norms and conven-
tions often solve pure coordination problems without the intervention of
law—as with various arrangements for standing in the registration line in
a hotel.
We have a mixture of conflict and coordination if we have a situation in
which some options open to us pose problems of pure conflict while other
options are pure coordination problems. Think of prisoner’s dilemmas:
Each target of the investigation is offered immunity in exchange for testi-
2. H ardin, Morality within the Limits of R eason , 35–53.
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mony that leads to the conviction of his accomplice, but only if the accom-
plice does not accept a similar deal first. H ere there are two possibilities
that are pure conflict—namely, those in which one prisoner confesses
while the other does not. The payoff structure that defines a prisoner’s
dilemma is one in which each prisoner’s top preference is for getting im-
munity (the jackpot), even though that means the sucker’s payoff for his
silent accomplice; his second-best option is coordinating with his partner
on joint silence; his third-best option is coordinating on joint confession;
and his worst option is is the one in which he gets the sucker’s payoff
because he stays silent while his partner confesses.
Note that if the two opportunities for pure conflict are removed, the
prisoners have a pure coordination problem that is easily solved: they both
prefer mutual silence to mutual confession. That is why, in the context of
our criminal law, we often see elaborate efforts by police and prosecutors
to keep all four options open and equally elaborate efforts by at least one
of the ‘‘prisoners’’ to remove the pure conflict options. It is of the first
importance to notice also, however, that in many other sorts of situations
that have this same strategic structure—ranging from mundane business
transactions to the control of nuclear weapons—we may all have a strong
interest in defining social structures that eliminate the pure conflict op-
tions.
Now it is fairly obvious that pure coordination problems are, from the
standpoint of moral theory, much less difficult than the other strategic
problems we face. In pure coordination problems we can all be better off
if and only if we coordinate our behavior. Further, if we coordinate, no
one gets harmed, or even forced to take a second best option, and aggre-
gate welfare is improved. Sadists, bullies, and the envious aside, then, we
do not in general face motivational problems in these situations. Rather,
the problems we face are merely those of communication and organiza-
tion. (H ardin has an instructive example of this in the way Sweden went
about changing from left-hand to right-hand driving.3)
Moreover, it is also clear that mixtures of conflict and coordination
problems (such as prisoner’s dilemmas) are often more manageable than
those of pure conflict. In the former, we at least have the possibility of
arranging a second-best outcome for everyone, and better yet, if we can
somehow arrange effectively to block serious consideration or implemen-
3. H ardin, Morality within the Limits of R eason , 51–52.
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tation of the pure conflict elements of such mixed situations (e.g., by
making them unthinkable or undoable), we have effectively moved these
problems into the realm of pure coordination. The Mutual Assured De-
struction strategy of nuclear deterrence attempted to do this by making
first strike unthinkable; verification treaties attempted to do this bymaking
first strike undoable.
Problems of pure conflict remain, however, and they present us with
serious theoretical difficulties as well as grim practical choices. In such
situations some people are going to be the losers, and absent motives of
beneficence or justice on their part—motives strong enough to make them
genuinely willing to yield—getting a stable result will be difficult. More-
over, from the standpoint of moral theory, we presumably do not want to
recommend that people be genuinely willing to yield unless their yielding
is justifiable. Yet how often is it the case, even in theory, that in matters of
distributive justice we can identify precisely who should be the loser? Per-
haps we can do this in clear cases of intentional wrongdoing by competent
adults who are responsible for their characters. But in most cases Yoss-
arian’s problem4 remains as poignant for us as it was for him: he could see
why the war had to be fought, and why, if it were fought, people had to
die. What he could not see was how it followed from that that he, Yoss-
arian, had to die.5
4. Joseph H eller, Catch-22 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1961), 102.
5. Yossarian famously takes everything personally. It is perfectly clear to him,
for example, that German antiaircraft gunners are trying to kill him, and he is not
persuaded at all by the argument that they are not shooting at him personally but
rather shooting at ‘‘everyone.’’ (See H eller, Catch-22, 16–17.) But here is the
passage relevant to what I call Yossarian’s problem. Yossarian says (102):
‘‘I don’t want to be in the war anymore.’’
‘‘Would you like to see our country lose?’’ Major Major asked.
‘‘We won’t lose. We’ve got more men, more money and more material. There
are ten million men in uniform who could replace me. Some people are getting
killed and a lot more are making money and having fun. Let somebody else get
killed.’’
‘‘But suppose everybody on our side felt that way.’’
‘‘Then I’d certainly be a damned fool to feel any other way. Wouldn’t I?’’
This refrain is repeated at the end of the book when, after Yossarian has flown
seventy bombing missions, he is considering desertion. (435–36.) It is hard to
resist pointing out that H eller’s book was published in the same year (1961) as the
first edition of Marcus Singer’s Generalization in Ethics.
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Disability, Strategic Action, and Reciprocity
The general point should be obvious: we must all act strategically, but we
are well advised to arrange to do so, as much as possible, in situations
where we face only problems of pure coordination. I want to suggest that
in the context of disability issues, though we must of course consider care-
fully what to do in cases of pure conflict, we should also examine very
carefully the options we have for moving such issues into the realm of
coordination problems.
In general, discussing disability issues in terms of equality is not helpful
in this regard—whether it is equality of access, opportunity, life prospects,
or capacities that we have in mind. Proposals to make people equal in
some respect invite us to think in terms of conflict. We want to know
whether we are going to have to ‘‘take’’ resources from some in order to
‘‘bring others up’’ to a predefined level, and if so how we can justify this
sort of redistribution. We want to know whether we can draw a principled
line that will justify such redistribution in the case of some disadvantages
(e.g., those arising from bad luck in one’s choice of viruses) and not for
others (such as those arising from bad luck in one’s choice of parents).
And we will want to know whether the social costs of pursuing equality
for the disabled can be contained or whether they are likely to be ratcheted
up by a perpetually expanding definition of disability or an increasingly
high standard of equality. All such thoughts distract us from considering
the possibilities for dissolving such conflicts by transforming them into
coordination problems.
Thinking about reciprocity, however, is helpful here. An effective norm
of reciprocity resolves problems of pure conflict by seeing to it that people
who are burdened by one aspect of a social relationship, policy, or transac-
tion are benefited in return by another aspect of it. And when reciprocity
is ‘‘full’’ or complete, meaning that the eventual return to the one who
has been burdened is proportional to that person’s sacrifice, then there is
no net loss to anyone. The strategic problem of arranging for full reciproc-
ity is a problem of pure coordination, at least as long as envy, greed, and
various forms of malice are kept out of the picture. These coordination
problems are far from simple ones, but full reciprocity takes many forms
other than a direct tit-for-tat exchange.6 In a setting characterized by gen-
6. Lawrence C. Becker, R eciprocity (Boston: Routledge, 1986), chap. 3.
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eralized reciprocity, for example, both benefactor and recipient can be
confident that ‘‘what goes around, comes around’’ and that any recipient
will eventually be someone else’s benefactor just as surely as any benefactor
will eventually be the recipient of someone else’s beneficence.
Full Reciprocity and Coordination
Now suppose, as a first approximation to appropriate conduct in these
matters, that we consider a social environment (like our own) that is char-
acterized by a robust, complex norm of reciprocity for social interac-
tions—a norm that defines at least a minimal level of justice in social ar-
rangements. Let us leave aside, for the moment, the fact that some people
(at least in some circumstances) are not motivated to reciprocate. And let
us assume that the people who are motivated to reciprocate also recognize
and are often satisfied by reciprocal arrangements that are very indirect,
institutionalized, and delayed—as they are, for example, with various
forms of insurance. Then let us consider the ways in which some people,
against their wishes and choices, may both need an unusual amount of
help from others and be unable to reciprocate for it—or at least to recipro-
cate fully for it.
Surely the appropriate strategic response to this is, as far possible, to
make full reciprocity possible for such people. It makes little difference
what the cause of their inability is—whether it is polio or poverty, for
example. If we can arrange things so that they can and do reciprocate, it
is hard to see what objection there could be to that from the standpoint
of the initial benefactors, since they will be repaid. And it is equally hard
to see what objection there could be from the standpoint of the recipro-
cally minded disabled themselves, since this strategic response to their dis-
ability offers a very powerful and socially benign ratchet mechanism—one
which they will control—for their getting all the help for which reciprocal
returns will eventually emerge, however indirectly. (As long as each incre-
ment proposed by the disabled will be fully reciprocated, it would be stu-
pid for the able to confine rehabilitation or assistance to some arbitrary
minimum. This is so not only because the increased benefits will cancel
the increased burdens but because there is often a sort of ‘‘surplus value’’
created by increasing the level of functioning for a disabled person. Yet
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since the benefits of reciprocation are lost when the recipient refuses the
proffer of increased help, recipients retain control of this ratchet effect.)
A caution here: I am not proposing that we think along the lines of
imposing a direct, tit-for-tat duty of reciprocation on the disabled—
something like a loan for a college education, to be repaid directly to the
lender by the very person initially benefited. Rather, I am simply proposing
that in dealing with disability issues we should first look for new physical
and social arrangements that eliminate anyone’s serious, persistent inabil-
ity to engage in fully reciprocal social interactions, however indirect those
interactions might be. And I am suggesting that in this context we need
not be concerned with refining the definition of disability—or even with
singling out a special class of disabled people for special treatment. Any
persistent inability to reciprocate poses the same sort of strategic prob-
lems—which we should, if possible, solve by restoring the ability to recip-
rocate. Among reciprocally minded people (surely the vast majority in our
society), such coordination on reciprocity will pay for itself in the long run
and immediately turn disability issues from problems of pure conflict to
problems of pure coordination.
Indeed, for that reason I am suggesting that as a first approximation we
may as well consider the inability to reciprocate, when it is more than
merely transient, to be the very definition of the sort of disability that
unambiguously calls for social assistance. Thus, for example, parents, chil-
dren, or spouses who are persistently exhausted and socially isolated by
the burdens of caring for profoundly disabled relatives are effectively dis-
abled in this sense, and their situation warrants appropriate social assis-
tance as much as does an inability imposed by paraplegia or Alzheimer’s
disease. But the nature and scale of the requisite assistance for all such
disabilities, in this first approximation, is to be defined in terms of what
can in fact be fully reciprocated, since that is the least problematic issue.
It is worthwhile to reflect on how many issues even this first approxima-
tion settles. H aving level or ramped access to public buildings, for exam-
ple, is useful for service technicians, furniture movers, delivery people, and
parents pushing baby strollers as well as for wheelchair users, and the recip-
rocal social benefits begin to accrue immediately, not only from the in-
creased participation of mobility-impaired people but from others’ in-
creased efficiency. The standard placement of signage introduced by
accommodating the blind and visually impaired has similar immediate
benefits for others. And, in general, problems of access to public transpor-
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tation, accommodations, educational opportunities, medical care, rehabili-
tative services, and employment opportunities—for those who can and will
fully reciprocate for them—can be fully addressed by a strategic concern
for achieving full reciprocity.
Partial Reciprocity, Litigant’s Dilemmas, and Settlements
The next step is to consider disability cases that present us with a mix-
ture of conflict and coordination problems—ones in which the conflict
element cannot be removed because no new physical or social arrange-
ments can be found in which full reciprocity can be restored, even among
reciprocally minded people. Some people with profound cognitive disabil-
ities appear to present us with this situation, as do some people with espe-
cially severe physical handicaps. In such cases it may be that significant
social assistance can dramatically improve the situation for the disabled
person but will inevitably impose a net cost on those who provide it.
Let us imagine that this is so in some cases and that the best option for
the disabled person (and the worst for others) is to get an enforceable
right to maximally effective social assistance, even though it imposes a net
cost on others. Conversely, the best option for the others (and the worst
for the disabled) is to get an enforceable right to refuse to provide any
assistance at all to the disabled beyond what can be reciprocated. These
are the pure conflict options. H owever, the second-best outcome for both
parties is a settlement—just below the ignition point for conflict—in which
some suboptimal but acceptable level of social assistance is provided to the
disabled at a net cost acceptable to the providers, but is reciprocated as far
as possible. The third-best option for both parties is a standoff in which
neither assistance nor reciprocation occurs. These are coordination points.
Schematically, we have these four options:
1. Claim rights to assistance; duties to provide it
2. Mutually suboptimal settlement
3. Standoff
4. No claim rights to assistance; no duties to provide it
And we are imagining that the preference order for these options is 1, 2,
3, 4 for the disabled, 4, 2, 3, 1 for everyone else.
This is, of course, the structure of the payoffs in a prisoner’s dilemma,
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but the strategic situation is rather different from that described by the
standard prisoner’s dilemma story. In a prisoner’s dilemma, when both
parties go for their best options, they both confess and get what they agree
is the third-best option. H ere, in what we may call the ‘‘litigant’s di-
lemma,’’ when both parties go for their best options (let us say through a
lawsuit) it is not clear what will happen. One party or the other may win
outright, or both may get some sort of suboptimal settlement, or it may
even be that a standoff results (e.g., if the case is mooted by the courts).
In any case, the difficulty is that legal claims for options 1 and 4 must be
adjudicated, and moral claims for them go through an even messier proc-
ess before they become enforceable norms. These decision processes are
typically quite unpredictable. Litigation (or moral suasion) is costly for
both parties no matter what happens, and if both parties have plausible
cases to the extent that it is simply not clear in advance which party has
the stronger argument, the outcome is quite uncertain. Even if both par-
ties press the conflict very hard—that is, press for their best options—there
is often even no discernible change in the probabilities of the possible
outcomes. This is the heart of the litigant’s dilemma.
In such situations it is often in the strategic interests of both parties to
settle. For one thing, a settlement is within their (joint) control. Opting
for conflict is opting for loss of control, and that is not usually desirable.
And if one is going to keep control by opting for coordination rather than
conflict, then the choice is settlement vs. standoff, and it is hard to see
why one would choose the standoff. (Accepting a standoff as a tactical
move in a protracted conflict does not count as opting for coordination.)
Moreover, coordination is the maximin option in these situations—the
only way for each party to immunize herself against her least favored out-
come. (By contrast, in a prisoner’s dilemma it is conflict—confession—
that is the maximin strategy for both.) And again, between the two coordi-
nation options, settlement is surely preferable to standoff. Finally, the sort
of stability and mutual goodwill achieved by a genuine settlement is a
genuine prize. Winners face new strategic problems with losers, and vice
versa. In some cases, these new problems are as difficult as the old ones.
For all these reasons, in a reasonably just and beneficent social order of
people who are, for the most part, willing to reciprocate, it seems reason-
able to suggest that when we find ourselves in a litigant’s dilemma with
respect to disability issues, we should settle rather than opt for pure con-
flict—if we have the chance. And it seems to me that such a suggestion is
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supported by reflection on the multitude of disturbing lawsuits, threat-
ened lawsuits, and administrative and arbitration proceedings concerning
students with cognitive disabilities in public schools.
Residues
That leaves cases of pure conflict—cases in which people either cannot or
will not reciprocate (or accept either full or partial reciprocity) or in which
they either cannot or will not settle for second best in order to avoid con-
flict. It is here that the classic problems of beneficence and distributive
justice find their most severe tests.
I have little to add here, in a mere afterword, to the discussion of those
difficult issues. My suggestion is simply that we should take the opportu-
nity, afforded to us by the strategic value of norms of reciprocity, to mini-
mize the range and intensity of such pure conflict in matters concerning
human disabilities. It would be a great benefit to us all if we could arrange
in this way to make the most difficult and discouraging problems of dis-
ability and distributive justice purely academic.
